

MAP STUDY




Figure 6.13
UN Peacekeeping Operations in 2002

These are the ongoing peacekeeping operations of the UN as of May 2002.

Interpreting

1. Which operation is the longest-running and which is the most recent?
2. Access the UN Web site at www.un.org/Depts/cartographic/map/dpko/4000e.pdf to find the most recent changes.

Evolving Approaches to Peacemaking and Peacekeeping

Despite its many peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts, the United Nations had little expectation of making or keeping peace in conflicts that directly involved the United States or the Soviet Union. The Security Council could do little about crises involving the Soviets in

Eastern Europe (the Berlin Blockade, 1949; Hungary, 1956; Czechoslovakia, 1968), and the Americans have had a free hand in Latin America (Guatemala, 1954; the Bay of Pigs, 1961; Grenada, 1983). Nor did the United Nations override the principle of non-intervention "in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state" (Britain's crisis in Northern Ireland; China's conflict with the Soviet Union over Tibet).

After the embarrassment of Britain

How badly does the US need the UN? As a practical matter, the US wants and needs allies. UN approval confers legitimacy that even a superpower can't claim by itself, and such approval is essential in the Middle East.

— *Time* magazine,
14 October 2002

and France in the 1956 Suez Crisis, the major powers were left to sort out their own disputes through diplomatic and political means. But when these efforts did not produce the desired results, the superpowers were willing to fall back on military intervention, as the US did in Vietnam and the USSR did in Afghanistan.

In the 1980s, however, the patterns of peacemaking and peacekeeping began to change. The Soviets accepted UN observers to monitor their withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988. In 1989, for the first time since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, the United States co-operated with foreign observers in Central America through the Organization of American States (OAS). Other regional alliances began playing a role more consistent with UN peace initiatives in the late 1980s.

A more fundamental change emerged in the United Nations' reaction to Iraq's attacks upon its Kurdish and Shiite Muslim minorities after the Persian Gulf War of January and February 1991. The Security Council declared that the masses of refugees fleeing the region constituted a threat to international peace and security. As the *New York Times* reported on 6 April 1991: "Never before has the United Nations Security Council held that governments threaten international security if their actions force thousands of their citizens to flee to other lands."

Since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, peacemaking has replaced peacekeeping as the dominant feature of UN interventions. In 1991, the United Nations authorized the use of military force to drive Iraqi invaders out of Kuwait in the Gulf War. (See page 351.) In 1992, for the first time, the UN authorized the use of massive military force to ensure that humanitarian aid reached the people of Somalia. It sent a smaller force for the same purpose to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

(See page 230.) In 1994, the UN struggled to contain the overwhelming human misery resulting from civil war in Rwanda, but played almost no role in ending the fighting. (The UN's role in Somalia and Rwanda is examined in more detail below.)

In 2001, the UN was dragged into a US-led NATO operation in Afghanistan in the "war on terrorism," which is covered in detail in Chapter 12. Then, in 2002, the US decided that Iraq was also a terrorist state and should be disarmed. As with Afghanistan, the US felt that the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, should be overthrown by a US-led, UN-sanctioned military operation. The UN, however, preferred negotiations and the resumption of weapons inspections in Iraq. Faced with a clear lack of enthusiasm in the UN, US President George W. Bush bluntly threatened to attack Iraq with or without UN sanction.

Canada was caught in the middle trying to show support for the US as our neighbour and ally yet preferring to follow the UN. However, given the poor state of Canada's military forces, our role is more symbolic than real. David Pratt, Chairman of the Commons defence committee, stated bluntly that our forces are "essentially tapped out" and "would not be significantly adding anything to the allied forces".

THE LESSONS OF SOMALIA AND RWANDA

With the defeat of Soviet communism, the US developed a new role as a kind of world police force. Trouble spots anywhere in the world that touched on American interests became targets for intervention. International peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, which normally come under UN jurisdiction, now relied very heavily on US support. In

most cases, this close relationship between UN moral leadership and US military power worked well. In other cases, however, such as Somalia, the US-led UN operations became confused and ineffective. What started out as UN peacekeeping operations in some countries soon turned into *peacemaking* operations. As casualties began to mount, individual nations, including the US, began to reconsider the missions and withdraw support. This left the UN with token peacekeepers caught in the middle of active civil war zones. The main lesson from these conflicts was that peacekeeping and peacemaking operations are very different, and one should not be confused with the other.

Somalia

The Republic of Somalia was created in 1960 by unifying the former British Somaliland Protectorate and the Italian Trusteeship Territory of Somalia. Nine years later, in a bloodless military coup, the Marxist Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party took power and renamed the country the Somali Democratic Republic.

For more than 20 years the nation was ruled by the dictatorship of General Muhammed Siad Barre. His government led to the elimination of Somalia's fledgling democracy, nationalization of industries, drastic deterioration of the Somali economy, human rights abuses, and terrorism of the populace. For two decades, various independent Somali clans opposed Barre's regime and fought the military.

Civil war broke out in the drought-stricken land in 1988 between government forces and rebel groups such as the prominent Somali National Movement (SNM). The fighting forced UN staff and other aid workers in non-governmental relief organizations to abandon the nation in May 1989. Struggling to survive

famine, disease, and insurgency, one-third of the Somali population became internal refugees. Others fled the warring factions to neighbouring Djibouti and Ethiopia.

By 1991, Barre and the Somali National Front (SNF) proclaimed a new Somaliland Republic in the north. A new provisional government was then set up in the south, but clan-based guerrilla groups and militias competed for political power. By the end of the year, part of Mogadishu was under the control of the 5000 fighters of interim president Mahammad (Abgall clan). The other part was held by General Muhammad Aidid (Habar Gidir clan) and his 10 000 guerrillas.

The report of a 1991 United Nations-sponsored mission to Somalia suggested that hope for settlement of the civil war lay in international support. Instead, the UN tried to negotiate with the clan warlords to resolve the conflict. However, this only added to the power and prestige of the warlords.

Conditions in Somalia deteriorated as famine spread, and 300 000 to 500 000 people died. Thousands of people fled to Mogadishu, but the warlords controlled the distribution of food and other essential items. They used food as a weapon by providing it only to those Somalis who supported their particular clan. They also opposed the idea of any UN military forces entering the nation.

A ceasefire agreement mediated by the United Nations came into effect in March 1992. At that time, the only UN agency at work in Somalia was UNICEF, and its work was restricted to the capital city of Mogadishu. A few voluntary relief agencies—the international Red Cross and Save the Children—were able to offer humanitarian aid to a limited number of rural Somalis. Despite their best efforts, food supplies destined for famine victims continued to be looted and used by those

engaged in fighting the civil war. By June 1992, 6 million people faced starvation.

In 1992, with Operation Restore Hope, the UN authorized the use of massive military force to ensure that humanitarian aid reached the people of Somalia. Budgeted at US\$1.5 billion per year, it was the most expensive humanitarian aid effort ever undertaken. In December, a US-led coalition force arrived in Somalia to begin land-based intervention, which put UN soldiers in direct confrontation with the warring factions. In 1993, 18 US soldiers were killed in an operation in Mogadishu and their bodies were dragged through the city's streets.

More than 30 000 UN troops were sent to Somalia, but the humanitarian mandate of the UN mission changed to demobilizing the warlord factions. At least 6000 people died in clashes between UN forces and rival Somali factions, including dozens of UN peacekeepers. The United Nations was unable to maintain a ceasefire, and so

the mission ended in failure. UN troops were withdrawn by March 1995.

In July 2000 an interim 245-member Transitional National Government was established in Mogadishu under UN supervision. It has a three-year mandate to create a new constitution and hold elections to form a permanent national Somali government.

Rwanda

In the central African country of Rwanda, the predominant ethnic group is Hutu. The Hutus make up about 85 per cent of the population, while Tutsis make up the remaining 15 per cent. Since the 1600s, hereditary Tutsi kings ruled Rwanda. In 1959, seeking equality for all groups in Rwanda, the majority Hutu tribe overthrew the Tutsi monarchy. After four years of war, Rwanda was declared a republic, and in 1962 the nation gained its independence.

The majority Hutus formed a new government under President Gregoire Kayibanda, and held power until a coup in 1973. Supported by the Rwandan military, General Juvenal Habyarimana became president and instituted a new constitution, which limited the presidency to members of the Hutu tribe. The politically empowered Hutus forced about 150 000 Tutsis into exile. The Tutsi exiles formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and invaded Rwanda in 1990.

The Rwandan Patriotic Front continued its campaign of hostilities until 1993, when the government of Rwanda and the RPF signed the Arusha Peace Agreement. This agreement gave the United Nations a broad role to play as a Neutral International Force (NIF). The force would supervise the implementation of the agreement during a transitional period, which was to last 22 months.

A UN delegation, which was sent to Rwanda to investigate the possible role of



Figure 6.14

US troops in Mogadishu. US troops entered Somalia with high hopes, but the ambush and death of American soldiers had a negative impact on US public opinion for such UN-sponsored peacemaking operations.



Figure 6.15

This display of human skulls is all that remains of some 5000 Tutsis massacred in the Ntarama Church compound in April 1994. Could the UN have prevented this kind of mass slaughter?

the NIF, argued for the rapid deployment of an international force and swift establishment of transitional institutions. The delegation warned that any delay might lead to the collapse of the peace process.

Once in Rwanda, Canadian General Romeo Dallaire, commander of the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), advised the UN that tensions between the Hutus and Tutsis were increasing. He requested more troops and a mandate to use force in response to crimes against humanity, such as executions and attacks on displaced persons or refugees. He told the UN that weapons distribution among the Hutus was escalating, terrorist activities were increasing, and death squad target lists were being drawn up. The commander warned of catastrophic consequences, but his requests for additional UN forces and changes to

the rules of engagement were denied. Instead, he was told that he had not provided conclusive or compelling evidence to support his plea.

The April 1994 assassinations of President Habyarimana of Rwanda and the Hutu president of neighbouring Burundi unleashed Hutu fury. As civil unrest erupted, UNAMIR troops tried to offer some protection. Belgian peacekeepers, for example, who were trapped within the presidential compound as they tried to prevent the assassination of the Rwandan prime minister, had to operate on orders not to fire until fired upon. The prime minister and 10 Belgian peacekeepers were executed, and the Belgian contingent of UNAMIR left Rwanda.

Unable to achieve a ceasefire, and denied the mandate to address the widespread massacres and chaos, the entire

UNAMIR operation was nearly suspended. Most of the UN peacekeepers from various countries were evacuated. Over a 13-week period, the Hutu-dominated army (Rwandan Armed Forces) and armed civilians killed more than 800 000 Tutsis. It became clear that extremist Hutus intended a genocide of the entire Rwandan Tutsi population.

After a May 1994 Security Council resolution, 5500 UN peacekeepers were sent to Rwanda in June. These forces were followed by 2000 French troops, who were sent on a humanitarian mission to create a "safe zone" for refugees in southwestern Rwanda. Although the UN forces struggled to contain the overwhelming human misery, they played almost no role in ending the fighting. The Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front, along with tens of thousands of Tutsis from Burundi, eventually won military control in Rwanda and implemented a ceasefire. By March 1996 all UN forces had left Rwanda.

While civil strife between the two tribes has continued, there is a sense of reconciliation. In 2002, Rwanda's national government was led by President Paul Kagame (Tutsi) and Prime Minister Bernard Makuza (Hutu). An International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established to judge the key leaders, and more than 120 000 prisoners were put on trial for crimes arising from the 1994 genocide.

In its 1999 *Report of Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda*, the Inquiry identified 18 fundamental failures. It concluded: "While the presence of United Nations peacekeepers in Rwanda may have begun as a traditional peacekeeping operation to monitor the implementation of an existing peace agreement, the onslaught of the genocide should have led decision-makers in the United Nations—from the Secretary-

General and the Security Council to Secretariat officials and the leadership of UNAMIR—to realize that the original mandate, and indeed the neutral mediating role of the United Nations, was no longer adequate and required a different, more assertive response, combined with the means necessary to take such action." In other words, this was a peacekeeping mission that turned into a peacemaking mission, and the UN was not able to adjust to the change.

Although the report cast blame on the "leadership of UNAMIR," what is missing is any explanation as to why the repeated requests for military assistance by Dallaire were ignored. Part of the reason can be found in the disastrous UN mission in nearby Somalia. The US was in no mood to send additional troops to Rwanda after 18 of their soldiers had died in the Mogadishu ambush in 1993. The US-led UN failure in Somalia was the biggest background reason for the reluctance of any nation, particularly the US, to commit more troops to Rwanda.

CHALLENGES TO THE UN

As the world political scene changes, so too will the role of the United Nations. New questions on old issues will be raised: Should the UN take an aggressive role in fulfilling its mission of peace and security and solving social, economic, and humanitarian problems throughout the world? Can the UN gather sufficient forces to undertake major peacemaking and peacekeeping missions?

The key question for the near future, however, is whether the US will continue to work with the UN or simply ignore it. The US was willing to lead UN-sponsored operations in the Gulf War and the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. However, in 2002 the US made it clear that it would invade Iraq with or without UN support.

What can the UN do if the US is the aggressor nation in a conflict? The problem for the UN is that it needs the US more than the US needs the UN. A rift between the US and UN could have serious implications for the future.

This problem also exists with respect to the humanitarian role of the UN. The US has opposed many recent UN initiatives on the grounds they could interfere with national sovereignty and American interests. Since

the UN represents the world community, differences between the US and UN can add to the developing sense of the US standing alone against the world.

In 1945 the UN was formed to provide peace and security in the world. It was located in the US to ensure that the US would remain committed to the ideals and operations of the UN. Only the future will tell if the UN grows and remains effective or suffers the same fate as the League of Nations.

In Review

1. Why did people rebel against the government of General Barre in Somalia?
2. How did the warlords in Somalia use food as a weapon?
3. Using point-form notes, create a timeline that details UN involvement in the Somali civil conflict.
4. What were the origins of the conflict between the Hutus and the Tutsis in Rwanda?
5. What caused Canadian commander Romeo Dallaire in Rwanda to petition the UN for more soldiers and an expanded mandate for action? How did the UN respond?
6. What was the conclusion of the 1999 report on the UN operation in Rwanda?
7. What was the main lesson learned from the UN operation in Rwanda?

Summary

The United Nations was created with a General Assembly to represent all nations, and a Security Council that gave powerful nations a dominant role. With the development of the Cold War, the Security Council became deadlocked and matters of peace and security became more difficult to manage. In the Korean War, the principle of military peacemaking was applied as the United States led a coalition of UN forces to fight North Korean aggression. In the Suez Crisis, the UN was successful in providing a forum for discussion and resolution of the problem. One major

outcome of the Suez Crisis was the establishment of a UN peacekeeping (as opposed to peacemaking) force. Canada's role as an important peacekeeper and middle power was established. Lester Pearson's proposal for the UNEF, which was introduced at Suez, has been the model for UN peacekeeping activities since then.

As Cold War tensions have subsided, there has been renewed interest in the United Nations. Increasingly, the UN has become more active in conflicts and humanitarian work around the globe. The organization appears willing to use both its peacekeeping and peacemaking options in a still troubled world.